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The Pennsylvania Dead Man's Rule:
A Decedent's Delight
Thomas N. Silverman*
Since its inception more than eight decades ago, the Pennsylvania
"Dead Man's Rule" has proven to be the source of great conflict, con-
troversy, and debate.1 Reflecting a national concern, various legal com-
munities within the commonwealth have extolled the virtues and
shortcomings of the rule, while advancing arguments for its suste-
nance2 and abolition 3 respectively. Yet one undisputed reaction to the
rule remains a constant; the universal sense of injustice provoked
when it is applied to any given set of facts.
Historically, evidence, although highly relevant, has often been sup-
pressed from jury consideration on the basis of interest-analysis. 4 Hav-
ing discovered where the real interest of the witness lies, courts have
proceeded to quarantine juries from potentially distorted testimony.
At common law, a person was declared incompetent to testify if he or
his spouse was a party to the proceeding or had a direct pecuniary
interest therein.5 Parties and interested witnesses were thus presumed
incapable of accurate and truthful testimony. While modern-day
forums have generally abolished these class disqualifications, stating
that interest may affect credibility but not competency,6 they continue
to believe that, given the death or lunacy of a party-opponent, 7 witness-
A.B., University of Miami; J.D. Duquesne Law School; LL.M., Harvard Law School.
The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the contributions toward the writing of this
article made by James H. Chadbourn, Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. See MacElvee, A Code of Evidence-Contra, 20 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 220 (1949); Taxis,
The "Dead Man's Rule," 35 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 179 (1964); Windolf, A Code of Evidence for
Pennsylvania-Pro, 20 Pa. B. Ass'n Q. 218 (1949).
2. Eckert, The Dead Man's Rule Should Be Retained, 35 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 192 (1964).
3. Schulman, Repeal The Dead Man's Evidence Act, 35 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 183 (1964).
4. Interest was one of the five basic grounds for disqualification of a witness at com-
mon law. The other four were infancy, irreligion, conviction of a felony, and mental
derangement. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 481-599 (3d ed. 1940).
5. See generally 5 C. CHAMBERLAYNE, THE MODERN LAw OF EVIDENCE § 3669 (H. Joyce
ed. 1916) ("Under the practice at common law it was deemed that persons who were in-
terested or were parties to the proceedings, were, by reason of such fact, so under tempta-
tion to testify falsely that they should be rejected."). Norris v. Johnson, 5 Pa. 287 (1847);
Miller v. Frazier, 3 Watts 456 (Pa. 1825); see 5 U. Pr-r. L. REV. 125 (1939).
6. See Dalbey's Estate, 326 Pa. 285, 192 A. 129 (1937). See also C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 61 (1954).
7. Professor Wigmore attacked the Dead Man's Rule with vigor characteristic of his
distaste for this specie of legislation: "As a matter of policy, this survival of a part of
the now discarded interest-qualification is deplorable in every respect for it is based on
a fallacious and exploded principle, it leads to as much or more false decision than it
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interest should continue to serve as the basis of disqualification rather
than impeachment.
I. REASONS FOR THE RULE
The Pennsylvania Dead Man's Rule had its apparent genesis in the
bona fide but misplaced fear that survivors would take keen and uni-
form advantage of their granted longevity to lodge unfounded claims
against decedents' estates.8 Since death had sealed the lips of the de-
ceased, it was felt that even-handed justice required that the law should
seal the lips of the living as well.9 Or, stating the proposition in a dif-
ferent manner, permitting a jury to consider a survivor's uncontra-
dicted testimony would open the, door to prevarication and perjury.
Hence, the objective of the statute is to balance rights between
the decedent and his survivor so as to insure that no unfair advantage
may be taken of the former by the latter.10 It would thus appear that
prejudice is the worthy opponent which the statute was designed to
conquer. But, like all rules, the Dead Man Act is susceptible of two
interpretations. While it is a truism that no survivor should ipso facto
prevail in a legal contest with a person now deceased, the converse is
equally true. Decedents may take their stories to their graves, but to
bury with them legitimate debts or obligations owing to those who
survive would be an even more culpable miscarriage of justice. To do
so would be to penalize survival and reward death.
Practically speaking, the rule serves as an impervious wall to judicial
examination concerning the totality of events preceding the death or
court adjudicated lunacy of a party-opponent. By its language, the
statute forbids any party or witness to take the stand and relate pre-
terminus facts, once his interest is found to run counter to that of the
decedent." As a result, the jury must decide the merits of the case
prevents, and it encumbers the profession with a profuse mass of barren quibbles over
the interpretation of mere words." 2 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 578, at 697 (3d ed. 1940).
8. The present Dead Man's Rule, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958), and its fore-
runner, Act of April 15, 1869, Pa. P.L. 30, § 1, removed the broad common law disqual-
ification of interested witnesses in all but a few instances. Hence, it is considered an
enabling not a disabling act, i.e., persons competent to testify before its enactment re-
mained such and were unaffected by its provisions. Smith v. Hay, 152 Pa. 377, 25 A. 562
(1893).
9. Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. 297, 305 (1870).
10. Id.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958) provides:
Nor, where any party to a thing or contract in action is dead, or has been adjudged
a lunatic and his right thereto or therein has passed, either by his own act or by the
act of the law, to a party on the record who represents his interest in the subject in
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without the benefit of the survivor's obviously relevant testimony. In
effect, the rule operates so as to preclude an otherwise competent party
or witness from offering testimony to establish or defend his rights once
death or lunacy claims his adversary. Frequently, alternate sources of
admissible evidence are unavailable to the survivor, in which case his
interest, and not that of the decedent, is prejudiced.12
II. ELEMENTS OF THE RULE
A. Party to a Thing or Contract
Is Dead or Adjudicated a Lunatic
At its outset, the rule demands -the death or court-adjudicated
lunacy of an original party to the matter in issue..3 Though the fact of
death vel non is, in most instances, easily susceptible of proof, Penn-
sylvania courts have taken the position that an adjudication of in-
competency is not tantamount to an adjudication of lunacy.14 Nor is
the statute satisfied where a person has been adjudged weak-minded for
purposes of property management.' 5 Moreover, where a witness has
controversy, shall any surviving or remaining party to such thing or contract, or any
other person whose interest shall be adverse to the said right of such deceased or
lunatic party, be a competent witness to any matter occurring before the death of said
party or the adjudication of his lunacy, unless the proceeding is by or against the
surviving or remaining partners, joint promisors or joint promisees of such deceased
or lunatic party, and the matter occurred between such surviving or remaining part-
ners, joint promisors or joint promisees and the other party on the record, or between
such surviving or remaining partners, promisors or promisees and.-the person having-
an interest adverse to them, in which case any person may testify to such matters; or,
unless the action be ejectment against several defendants, and one or more of said
defendants disclaims of record any title to the premises in controversy at the time
the suit was brought and also pays into court the costs accrued at the time of his
disclaimer, or gives security therefor as the court in its discretion may direct, in
which case such disclaiming defendant shall be a fully competent witness; or, unless
the issue or inquiry be devisavit vel non, or be any other issue or inquiry respecting
the property of a deceased owner, and the controversy be between parties respec-
tively claiming such property by devolution on the death of such owner, in which
case all persons shall be fully competent witnesses.
12. McCormick made this observation concerning the inequities associated with the use
of dead man rules in general: "The- practical consequence of such statutes is that a
survivor who, without an outside witness, has rendered service, furnished goods or lent
money to a man whom he trusted, and from whom he took no written agreement, is
helpless if the other dies and the representative of his estate declines to pay. The sur-
vivor's mouth may even be closed in an accident arising from a fatal automobile collision
or where he seeks to defend a suit upon a note or an account which he has paid in cash
without taking a receipt." C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65 (1st ed. 1954). See also note
120 infra.
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958).
14. Yacabonis v. Gilvickas, 376 Pa. 247, 101 A.2d (1954); see 2 G. HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA
EVIDENCE § 767 (4th ed. 1953).
15. Wetzel v. Wetzel, 3 Pa. D. & C. 804 (C. P. Schuylkill Co. 1923).
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already testified, his testimony is not rendered incompetent by the
subsequent death or adjudicated lunacy of his adversary.' 6 Therefore,
what the statute ostensibly seeks to exclude is a unilateral narra-
tive at trial of previous events between parties, one of whom is now
dead or unavailable to give sworn testimony in his own behalf.'7
In defining the scope of the proceedings to which the Dead Man
Statute is applicable, Pennsylvania courts have chosen to expand the
purview of the rule so as to include all civil proceedings before any
commonwealth tribunal.18 Originally, the Act was thought to apply
solely to actions ex contractu in nature. Shortly after its creation, how-
ever, "the protections" of the statute were extended to cover actions of
trespass as well. In the case of Irwin v. Nolde,19 plaintiff brought an
action of trespass q.c.f. against the defendants for taking forcible pos-
session of his fields. Both defendants died before trial, and on appeal,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the plaintiff incompetent to
testify. The opinion cited section five clause (e) of the Act of 1887.20
Since then, Pennsylvania courts have consistently paid allegiance to
the statute's mandate.2'
The application of the rule to the classic automobile collison case,
wherein a participant succumbs to his received injuries or other un-
related causes prior to trial, has important modern-day consequences.
The hall-mark decision was Niebauer v. Schultz. 22 The plaintiff there
was a passenger in an automobile that was involved in an accident with
another operated by the defendant, who died before the case could be
16. This of course follows because there would be no motive or reason for the witness
to fabricate testimony if he were subject to direct rebuttal by his living opponent. Hay's
Appeal, 91 Pa. 265 (1880).
17. The Dead Man's Rule is an attempt, on the part of the legislature, to place both
parties on equal footing insofar as the opportunity to give testimonial evidence is con-
cerned. Thus, where one party, due to death, is unable to offer testimony going to the
facts of an intervivos transaction, the other surviving party should likewise be limited
in his ability to testify. See note 9 supra.
18. Crosetti's Estate, 211 Pa. 490, 60 A. 1081 (1905). In a recent decision, the Penn-
sylvania Dead Man's Rule was held inapplicable to criminal prosecutions. Common-
wealth v. Dicio, 218 Pa. Super. 268, 275 A.2d 868 (1971). Two alternative grounds for this
ruling exist: (1) the statute itself expressly restricts application of the rule to civil cases
only, or (2) the rule is prevented from being satisfied initially by the complete lack of
affinity between the interest of decedent and that of the commonwealth, i.e., that the
state in pursuing "the criminal process" is acting, not as the decedent's personal repre-
sentative, but is instead, responding to a wrong which has been perpetrated upon society
at large.
19. 164 Pa. 205, 30 A. 246 (1894).
20. Id. at 208, 30 A. at 246.
21. Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395 (1957); Lockard v. Vare, 230 Pa. 591, 79
A. 802 (1911).
22. 114 Pa. Super. 538, 174 A. 812 (1935).
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litigated. The trial court, 23 noting the "timeliness" of the defendant's
death, declared the plaintiff incompetent to testify against Schultz's
administrator. The general principle flowing from this ruling is that
all surviving parties or witnesses with adverse interests are incompetent
to testify to both pre- and post-incident facts once death or lunacy
takes its course. This holding is applicable to all personal injury ac-
tions wherein a surviving party, whether the plaintiff or defendant,
seeks to perpetuate his claim at the expense of the decedent's estate.
B. The Deceased Must Have an Actual
Right or Interest in the Matter
in Issue during His Lifetime
A sine qua non under the rule is that the deceased must possess
a viable interest at the time of his death.24 Thus, a decedent's repre-
sentative will not receive the prophylactic benefits of the statute unless
he can demonstrate that the rights which will be asserted or defended
did in fact belong to the deceased during his lifetime;25 for their
transfer upon death implies their existence during life. On the other
hand, uncertainty or indefiniteness as to the precise amount of the
decedent's interest will not frustrate the application of the statute. 26
By the same token, the decedent's interest will not be rendered specu-
lative, and therefore illegitimate, merely because it has neither been
reduced to judgment nor otherwise perfected by him prior to death.2 7
But where the decedent holds only a life estate or a true contingent
interest in property (depending upon his survival to vest in interest)
death terminates all of his rights, and there remains nothing for the
statute to protect.2 8 Similarly, where an action is premised upon a
wrongful death statute, 29 the Dead Man Act is inapplicable. Since
the statute places the right of action solely in the surviving family, it
cannot be said to have belonged to the decedent during his lifetime.30
23. Civil No. 608 (Pa. C.P. Erie Co., filed Feb. 1932).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958); see In re Hendrickson Estate, 388 Pa. 39, 130
A.2d 143 (1953); Security Trust Co. v. Feist, 333 Pa. 536, 5 A.2d 119 (1939); Kotz v. Smith,
253 Pa. 346, 98 A. 608 (1916); Davis v. Hawkins, 163 Pa. 228, 29 A. 746 (1893). See also
note 31 infra.
25. No jus tertii defenses, collateral claims, or class actions are permitted as a func-
tional basis for asserting the statute.
26. See note 30 infra.
27. Id.
28. Sturgeon v. Stevens, 186 Pa. 350, 40 A. 488 (1898).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953).
30. Mann v. Weiand, 81 1/2 Pa. 243 (1875). Where a survival action is brought by the
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Without the disability of the Act, the surviving parties or witnesses
remain competent to testify to the transaction. What is required to
exclude testimony under the statute is that the deceased hold some
interest in his own right, capable both of being passed to his represen-
tative and prejudiced by the admission of his survivor's uncontradicted
testimony. Essentially, a pecuniary interest must be attributed to the
deceased, i.e., the resolution of the matter in issue should either directly
enhance or deplete the assets of the decedent's estate.3 ' Under this view,
the following inchoate interests are considered defensible if held by
decedents at their death: pending tort claims involving the decedent
as either party-plaintiff or defendant;3 2 actions based upon a contract
or conveyance to which the deceased .was a party;u property disputes
that affect definable interests held by a decedent;8 4 and controversies
relative to the passage of commercial paper by, through, or to a person
now deceased. 85
C. The Right of Such Deceased or Lunatic Party
Must Have Passed Either by His Own Act
or by the Act of Law to a Party
on the Record Who Represents His Interest
Survival of a party or interested witness to a transaction involving a
person now deceased will not per se render him incompetent in litiga-
tion arising out of that transaction. In order to effect the disqualifica-
tion of a survivor, the decedent's interests must have passed, by his
own act or by operation of law, to a party on the record who rep-
resents his interest. 3 This may be illustrated by referring to a classic
decedent's personal representative to recover damages in tort for the death of his de-
cedent, the claim is deemed to have arisen in the decedent himself which passed upon
his death to his personal representative by operation of law. Therefore, where an adverse
party or interested witness seeks to testify, he is rendered incompetent by the Rule (ex-
cept for purposes of rebuttal if a surviving witness gives testimony against his interest).
Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 743 (1946). Where
a survival and wrongful death action are joined in the same suit, for purposes of pro-
cedural expediency, the defendant survivor is permitted to testify with respect to. both
causes of action. Dennick v. Schweirer, 381 Pa. 200, 113 A.2d 318 (1955). But see 17 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 114 (1955).
31. "The interest must be in the result of the particular suit. The mere fact that the
estate of the decedent may be interested in the question being tried, will not disqualifypersons adversely interested." Lancaster County Nat'l Bank v. Henning, 171 Pa. 399, 33 A.
335 (1895); see Annot., 45 A.L.R. 1477 (1926).
32. See note 22 supra.
33. Singer v. Singer, 49 Pa. D. & C. 392 (C.P. Dauphin Co. 1944).
.4. Leiber v. Eurich, 216 Pa; Super.' 374, 268 A.2d (1970).
"35. In re Estate of Carr, 436 Pa. 47, 258 A.2d 628 (1969).




situation in which the rule is applicable. Where a plaintiff asserts hi!
claim against the estate of a decedent (or duly adjudged lunatic), the
latter's interest passes, by operation of law, to the executors or ad-
ministrators of the decedent 37 (or, in the case of the lunatic, to the
guardian or committee in lunacy).8  With the automatic passage of
the defendant's interests to his representative as the party of record,
the plaintiff is rendered incompetent by definition; for he is necessarily
advancing an interest antithetical to that of the decedent-defendant.
Similarly, when an executor or administrator files suit to pursue a
legitimate interest held by a decedent or lunatic during his responsible
lifetime, the surviving defendant is precluded from testifying.3 9 Thus,
not only may the statute be used as a shield to protect or defend an
otherwise vulnerable decedent's estate from the attack of an oppor-
tunist; it may serve as a sword to silence dissent and thereby insure
victory where affirmative relief is desired. It should also be noted that
persons other than executors and administrators may be and often are
parties of record. Typically, heirs, devisees, and legatees who claim
their interests through a decedent or adjudged lunatic, may also defend
their rights against attack by third persons, inasmuch as they are con-
sidered parties to whom the interest of the decedent or lunatic has
passed.40 Correlatively, assignees, vendees, and grantees, where they
are found to represent the decedent's interest in the disputed property,
may also assert the rule and receive its benefits. 41
Under what might be construed as a subrogation philosophy, the
party of record, as subrogee, succeeds to all rights and remedies pos-
sessed by the decedent at his death. By its terms, the statute provides
that representatives (parties of record) may be either voluntary or
involuntary. 42 The first category includes all persons who have con-
sentually dealt with the deceased during his lifetime and who have
therefore agreed by implication or expression to serve as paladins of
a decedent's postmortem interests. The second group includes per-
sons who inherit their representative position via the ill-understood
Royer v. Epharata Borough, 171 Pa. 429, 33 A. 361 (1895); Grasso v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 562, 214 A.2d 261 (1965). See also 2 G. HENRY, PENN-
SYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 774 (4th ed. 1953).
37. See note 22 supra.
38. Benz v. Heckman, 332 Pa. 187, 2 A.2d 857 (1939); see note 14 supra.
39. See note 30 supra.
40. New York & Ontario Land Co. v. Weidner, 169 Pa. 359, 32 A. 557 (1895).
41. See note 48 infra.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958).
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concept "by operation of law." 43 Having neither bargained for nor
consented to their role as champion of the decedent's interest, the law
casts this standing upon them regardless of their personal desires. In
advance of the litigation, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to ascer-
tain who genuinely represents the decedent's interest. Clearly, heirs
achieve their status by operation of law. Given the absence of a will,
the law has unilaterally chosen specific persons to succeed to any and
all interests formerly held by the decedent. Donees, assignees, and
grantees, on the other hand, are persons who have voluntarily dealt
with the decedent during his lifetime but who later (after his death)
find themselves called upon to defend his interests in order to preserve
their own rights. Devisees and legatees fall somewhere in between; they
inherit their interests through the combination of voluntary conduct
on the part of the decedent, via the preparation of a will, and their
own individual act of acquiescence to the passage of his interests.
Before attempting interpretations of the Dead Man's Rule and its
consequences, one crucial query must be resolved. Who is the party of
record to whom the interest of the decedent has passed? Essentially, one
must carefully align the parties according to the source of their individ-
ual rights in order to discover who truly represents the decedent's inter-
est in the subject-litigation. Having identified which party of record is
standing in the shoes of the decedent, students of the Dead Man's Rule
may intelligently approach the task of disqualifying all those who pur-
port to advance adverse interests.
Special Rules Applicable to the Transfer
of Property by a Decedent During His Lifetime
1. Contest over real property rights-Where the heir seeks to set aside
;a gift or grant of real estate made by the decedent during his lifetime,
the propriety of the transfer becomes critical to the determination of
who represents the interests of the decedent, and, as a corollary, who
wins the exclusionary benefits of the statute.44 If the transfer is prima
facie valid, the transferee represents the interest of the decedent-
transferor. It necessarily follows that the heir, who is proposing an
43. "This term expresses the manner in which rights and sometimes liabilities devolve
upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of established rules
of law, without the act of cooperation of the party himself." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY
1243 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
44. For an interesting discussion of the "propriety of transfer" issue see Carpenter,
The Dead Man's Statute in Pennsylvania, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 399 (1959).
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interest contra to that of the decedent's transferee, is incompetent to
testify.45 Likewise where the deed given to the grantee by his dece-
dent-grantor is prima facie invalid, the grantee's interest is viewed as
being adverse to that of the decedent, his heirs, and all other prima
facie grantees from the decedent.46 Thus, in a contest between prior
and subsequent grantees of the same property, a prior grantee will be
disqualified who cannot, by independent proof, meet the prima facie
transfer already established by the subsequent grantee.47
2. Contest over personal property rights-The same rules govern dis-
putes over personal property rights between personal representatives
and donees or assignees. If the gift or assignment is prima facie valid,
the purported donee or assignee represents the decedent's interest.48
But if the transfer is determined to be prima facie invalid, the dece-
dent's personal representative is considered to represent his interests
in any suits brought by those seeking to establish the alleged gift or
assignment. 49
3. Commercial paper-Just as propriety of transfer is essential to the
resolution of real and personal property disputes, the fact or circum-
stance of transfer is the key to the assignment of rights and obligations
respecting the passage of commercial paper. Identification of the party
representing the decedent's interest is vital. It is of paramount impor-
tance to assess the decedent's intervivos status relative to the subject-
instrument under existing law.
Litigation in this area is governed by common law precedent as
modified by negotiable instrument's law, which has in turn been partly
supplemented or superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code. °
Although complex and sophisticated problems often arise in connec-
tion with the commercial exchange of multi-party instruments, many
rights thereunder are derivative in nature, and lend themselves to a
precise employment of the Dead Man Statute. Once "parties" are
identified according to their respective positions on the instrument,
interests can be categorically appraised.
45. Campbell v. Brown, 183 Pa. 112, 38 A. 516 (1897); Chambley v. Rumbaugh, 132
Pa. Super. 312 (1938), affd', 333 Pa. 319, 5 A.2d 171 (1939).
46. Paschall v. Fels, 207 Pa. 71, 56 A.2d 320 (1963); Herr v. Bard, 355 Pa. 578, 50 A.2d
280 (1947).
47. Herr v. Bard, 355 Pa. 578, 50 A.2d 280 (1947).
48. In re Don Savage's Estate, 420 Pa. 587, 218 A.2d 112 (1966).
49. Ford's Estate, 431 Pa. 185, 245 A.2d 443 (1968); Flanagan v. Nash, 185 Pa. 41, 39 A.
818 (1898).
50. Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code. Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12A, §§ 3-101 to 10-104 (1970).
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Under the well-recognized "Shelter Principle" contained in section
3-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code,51 proof of a negotiable in-
strument's transfer by a decedent-transferor to a present party of record
will operate so as to pass whatever interests were held by the transferor
to his transferee, who may then claim the exclusionary benefits of the
statute.. Furthermore, the transfer of such rights is not limited to
transfers for value; an instrument may be transferred as a gift, in which
case the donee acquires whatever rights his donor had.52 Consider, for
example: 53
A makes a note or check payable to B (as payee). B "transfers" the
instrument (by endorsement or otherwise) to C and then dies. In
an action by C to enforce A's obligation on the instrument, the
maker (A) is incompetent to testify to all matters surrounding the
making of the note or check.54
By virtue of the umbrella-like theory upon which the "Shelter Prin-
ciple" is based, it would appear that the effects of the statute's applica-
tion do not end here; for any subsequent transferee who can trace his
interests back to the decedent-transferor may also use the statute to
avoid inquiry into facts surrounding the initial transfer. Consider, for
example:
A makes a note or check payable to B (as payee) who transfers it
(by endorsement or otherwise) to C. B then dies. C transfers it on
to D who transfers it on to E . . . to Z who seeks to enforce A's
obligation as maker of the instrument. A is incompetent to testify
to events relative to the drawing of the note or check.
Thus,'by asserting the statute, a decedent's transferee or one claim-
ing thereunder may effectively immunize himself from the initial
intervivos infirmities of the instrument. This means that the maker is
51. (1) Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the trans-
feror has therein, except that a transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud
or illegality affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense
or claim against it, cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in due
course.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-201 (1962 version with comments). Comment I to § 3-201
states: "any person who transfers an instrument transfers, whatever rights he has in it."
52. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-201, Comment 2.
53. It is assumed for purposes of this illustration and the one to follow that a valid
instrumental transfer was accomplished, i.e., that the transfer of "order paper" took place
by negotiation (proper. endorsement) and the transfer of "bearer paper" occurred by
means of an effective manual delivery.
54. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Donnelly, 247 Pa. 518, 93 A. 761 (1915); M. BROWN,
PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE ch. 10, § 3(d) (1949).
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precluded from raising the incompleteness or irregularity of the instru-
ment in toto. It is important to note that by invoking the statute, a
decedent's transferee may receive far greater protection in the enjoy-
ment of his rights than the law grants to .its premier receiver, the
holder in due course, who uniformly takes his interest subject to such
real (inter vivos) defenses as fraud in the factum, forgery, duress, in-
competency, illegality of the transaction, etc.55
D. The Surviving Party or Witness Must Have
an Adverse Interest to That of the
Decedent or His Representative
The Dead Man's Rule has no application to testimony which is
favorable to the interest of the decedent or the party to whom his
interest has passed.56 Witnesses offering such testimony remain com-
petent, and thus free to testify to every detail of the contested transac-
tion. To assist in ascertaining the nature of a witness's interest,
Pennsylvania courts have unanimously agreed upon when the ad-
versity of the witness should be tested.57 From the standpoint of
temporality of interest, in order to disqualify a witness, he must be
adversely interested at the time he is called to testify: that is, the ad-
verse interest must exist at the time when the oath is administered.58
In addition, the extent of a party's adverse interest is immaterial; for it
is the fact, not the quantum which disqualifies. 59 If the witness's
interest is adverse in any degree, it is sufficient to exclude his testi-
mony under the statute.60 Given this threshold level of adversity, the
true test of a witness's interest is: "whether or not he will gain or lose
55. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305 (Rights of a Holder in Due Course) in relevant
part provides:
to the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free
from ... (2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt, except:
(a) Infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract, and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction as renders the
obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with
neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its char-
acter or its essential terms.
56. Van Horne v. Clark, 126 Pa. 411, 17 A. 642 (1889). A witness whose interest is the
same as that of the decedent is competent. Toomey's Estate, 150 Pa. 535, 24 A. 697 (1892).
57. First Nat'l Bank v. Gerl, 225 Pa. 256, 74 A. 52 (1909); Broderick v. Emert, 110 Pa.
Super. 327, 168 A. 512 (1933). See also G. HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 772 (4th ed.
1953).
58. Id.




by his testimony at the expense of the decedent or lunatic as a direct
legal operation of the judgment; or whether the record will be legal
evidence for or against him in some other action.""' In order to justify
his exclusion as a witness, the survivor must have not only a definite
but a preponderating interest in the result of the suit. And when his
interest is so evenly balanced that he will neither gain nor lose by the
verdict, no matter for which party it is rendered, he is competent to
testify for either party (this is the so-called Equilibrium Rule). 62
It has often been said that it is adverse interest rather than adverse
testimony, which disqualifies a witness.6 3 This verbal precept is but a
short-hand statement of the true-interest-test quoted above: namely,
for disqualification to occur, it is necessary that the witness lose a
right or incur a responsibility which the law recognizes by the opera-
tion of the judgment in the subject-litigation. Note that proponents
of the Dead Man's Rule insist that witness credibility may easily be
distinguished from witness competency.6 4 Simply stated, their argu-
ment rests on purely financial grounds and does not take psychological
considerations into account. Thus, if for personal reasons, a witness
may be unfriendly to the decedent's cause, or partial to that of his
adversary, the witness's credibility but not competency may be af-
fected.65 Similarly, if a witness is related66 to one party or believes
himself interested when in fact he is not, this affects only the weight
which should be accorded his testimony and not its admissibility.67
The "adverse interest" referred to in and required by the statute
must be real-not nominal or indirect-to be disqualifying.6 Hence,
the competency of executors, administrators, and trustees is undis-
turbed by the death of the "surviving" party to the thing or contract
in issue.69 Since nominal parties have no personal direct pecuniary
61. In re Groome's Estate, 337 Pa. 250, 11 A.2d 271 (1940); Braine v. Spalding, 52 Pa.
247 (1866); 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 390 (W. Lewis ed. 1899).
62. Dickson v. McGraw Bros., 151 Pa. 98, 24 A. 1043 (1892); Jordan's Appeal, 107 Pa. 75
(1884). Where both parties to the controversy claim under the same person who is dead,
neither is competent to testify. Paschall v. Fels, 207 Pa. 71, 56 A. 37 (1903).
63. In re Edmundson's Estate, 359 Pa. 429, 103 A. 277 (1918); King v. King, 96 Pa. Super.
585 (1929).
64. See note 2 supra.
65. Billow v. Billow, 360 Pa. 343, 61 A.2d 817 (1949); Packer v. Noble, 103 Pa. 188
(1883).
66. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Szabo, 391 Pa. 272, 138 A.2d 85 (1958).
67. Erisman v. Walters, 26 Pa. 467 (1856).
68. Gamble v. Hepburn, 90 Pa. 439 (1879); see note 61 supra.
69. And, vice versa, the urviving party is incompetent to testify if the nominal
party in interest dies. Rozelle v. Lewis, 37 Pa. Super. 563 (1908); but where such
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interest in the outcome of the litigation, they may testify at will.
Under this same rationale servants and agents in suits by or against
their principals are, generally speaking, competent to describe con-
troversial pre-terminus events.70 The Dead Man's Rule also applies to
transactions involving the corporate entity, its stockholders and direc-
tors. Where the litigation concerns a dispute between the corporation
and one who represents the interests of the decedent, all corporate
stockholders are considered interested parties and are therefore unable
to testify for the corporation. 71 However, directors, executives, and
corporate employees who are not also stockholders, are competent wit-
nesses against the decedent's estate.72 Hence, where it is established that
such persons do hold stock, either individually73 or in their spouse's
name,74 they are considered witnesses with adverse interests, and as
such, are incompetent.
Q
E. The Testimony Offered by the Witness Must Relate
to Matters Occurring before the Decedent's
Death or the Adjudication of Lunacy
It is well established that the Pennsylvania Dead Man's Rule
permits a witness, despite his adverse interest, to testify to facts which
occurred after the death of the decedent or the adjudication of lunacy.75
But the ability of such interested witnesses to testify to events which
preceded the decedent's death is not as clearly delineated by the
statute.76 Strictly construed, if the topic to be discussed took place be-
parties (executors, administrators, and trustees) seek to advance interests in their own
right against a decedent's estate, they are incompetent. In re Buttorff's Estate, 329 Pa.
561, 198 A. 30 (1938); Heydrick's Appeals, 109 Pa. 610, 1 A. 31 (1885).
70. In re Groome's Estate, 337 Pa. 250, 11 A.2d 271 (1940); Sargeant v. National Life
Ins. Co., 189 Pa. 341, 4 A. 351 (1899).
71. Swoope's Estate, 317 Pa. 584, 177 A. 748 (1935); In re Zimmerman's Estate, 77 Pa.
D. & C. 90 (C.P. Lancaster Co. 1951). But see Annot., 163 A.L.R. 1215 (1946) (a stockholder's
interest was considered too remote and indirect to affect the witness's ability to testify
against a decedent's estate).
72. In re Groome's Estate, 337 Pa. 250, 11 A.2d (1940); Sorg v. First German Congre-
gation, 63 Pa. 156 (1869); Philadelphia Ins. Co. v. Washington Ins. Co., 23 Pa. 250 (1854).
See also 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 333 (W. LEwis ed. 1899).
73. Broderick Co. v. Emert, 110 Pa. Super. 327, 168 A. 512 (1933).
74. Because of the common law theory of the unity of husband and wife, if one
spouse is incompetent to testify by virtue of adverse interest, the other spouse is like-
wise incompetent. Uhl v. Mostetter, 298 Pa. 124, 148 A. 61 (1929).
75. See cases cited note 77 infra. The Act of April 15, 1869, Pa. P.L. 30, § 1, precluded
an interested witness from testifying to facts which occurred both before and after the
decedent's death, i.e., the witness was not competent to testify at all.
76. See In re Lipper's Estate, 106 Pa. Super. 123, 161A.569 (1932) (testimony received
concerning events after death which tend to prove occurences prior to death). But see
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fore the statutorily-imposed cut-off date, the Act of 1887 would appear
to prevent witness testimony completely.77 Indeed, under just such an
interpretation, some Pennsylvania courts have totally barred from
inquiry "any matter that occurred during the lifetime of the de-
ceased."'78 Similarly, others have maintained that a decedent's presence
or absence at the contested transaction is immaterial to the decision of
whether or not to exclude testimony which relates thereto.79 Still
others have refused to consider testimony of transactions wholly dis-
tinct from the matter in issue if it has any bearing on the thing or
contract under consideration before the court.80 Witnesses proposing
such testimony have strenuously argued that, in order to disqualify
their testimony, the decedent must have played an active personal part
in the matter to be discussed. This position has been uniformly re-
jected in Pennsylvania.8' In siding with the strict constructionists,
Pennsylvania forums have apparently relied on an implied-in-silence
rationale to exclude these in-court descriptions of ex parte incidents.
The broad, unconditional language of the Act would appear to support
the view that a decedent need not have been physically present at, nor
have otherwise participated in the transaction to exclude his survivors
testimony. The statute reads: "any matter occurring before death," a
phrase seemingly encompassing every conceivable aspect of the decedents
life.82 There is a more workable and rational proposal for interpreting
the Act, often referred to as "the test of contradiction."88 This test,
which appeals to the basic reasons underlying the enactment of Dead
Man Acts in general, may be stated as follows: "the surviving party or
witness should be disqualified from testifying only with regard to
matters which the deceased party could have contradicted had he
Psinakas v. Psinakas, 177 Pa. Super. 250, 111 A.2d 163 (1955); Keating v. Nolan, 51 Pa.
Super, 320 (1912) (allowed testimony from witnesses concerning the date of decedent's
death).
77. Swieckowski v. Sypniewski, 294 Pa. 323, 144 A. 141 (1928); Sutherland v. Ross, 140
Pa. 379, 21 A. 354 (1891); Neibauer v. Schultz, 114 Pa. Super. 538, 174 A. 812 (1935).
78. Id.
79. Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395 (1957). Compare Lockard v. Vare, 330
Pa. 591, 79 A. 802 (1911), with Mozino v. Canuso, 384 Pa. 220, 120 A.2d 300 (1956), noted
in 32 TEMP. L.Q. 399 (1959).
80. Lieber v. Eurich, 201 Pa. Super. 186, 192 A.2d 159 (1963).
81. See cases cited note 77 supra.
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958).
83. This test, which is proposed in 62 DICK. L. REv. 174 (1958), reflects the interpre-
tation given similar dead man statutes in other jurisdictions. See McCary v. McMorris, 265
Ala. 493, 92 So. 2d 319 (1957); Juritch v. Yuritch, 139 N.J. Eq. 439, 51 A.2d 901 (1947); Harris
v. Berry, 231 S.C. 201, 98 S.E.2d 251 (1957); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 303 S.W.2d 432
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
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lived.1 4 Although Pennsylvania courts have not yet expressly adopted
this standard, decisions do exist which reflect this analysis.8 5
III. ExcEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS TO THE STATUTE
The great number and variety of exceptions to the Pennsylvania
Dead Man's Rule can only be construed as a monument to its im-
potence. Comment on these diverse phenomena should begin with one
important preliminary observation: only testimony from a survivor
(as distinguished from written evidence of a decedent) is rendered in-
competent by the statute.86 For purposes of analysis, exceptions to the
rule may be conveniently divided into two distinct classes. Substantive
exceptions derive their efficacy from the language of the statute itself;
while procedural exceptions have chronologically developed from
sources beyond the four comers of the rule.
A. Substantive Exceptions
Section five, clause (e) of the Act of 1887 expressly provides for three
substantive exceptions to its possible application. 17 These exceptions
will be considered individually.
The first exception concerns proceedings by or against surviving
partners, joint promisors, or joint promisees of the deceased or lunatic
party. Where the proposed testimony relates to matters between such
surviving persons and the adverse party or interested witness now
offering testimony, the latter is competent to testify.8 In order for this
exception to exist, the transaction must have occurred exclusively be-
tween surviving persons. To involve the decedent or lunatic as a party
to either the proceeding or the contested transaction in any way is to
disqualify, the offering witness8 9
The second substantive exception pertains to questions of devisavit
vel non and related issues of property devolution. To help resolve these
issues, the statute provides for fully competent witnesses in controver-
sies between the respective parties, if all parties claim such property
84. Id.
85. Mozino v. Canuso, 384 Pa. 220, 120 A.2d 300 (1956).
86. Rauenkahn v. Sigman, 376 Pa. 26, 110 A.2d 688 (1954).
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958).
88. Lockard v. Vare, 230 Pa. 591, 79 A. 802 (1911); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958).
89. Lockard v. Vare, 230 Pa. 591, 79 A. 802 (1911).
327
Duquesne Law Review
by devolution on the death of the deceased owner.90 Thus, where one
party takes by devolution and another takes under the will, the former
is incompetent to testify because his interest is adverse to that of the
latter, who is deemed to represent the decedent in the controversy.91
The third and final substantive exception applies only to actions of
ejectment against several joint defendants.0 2 Where these facts exist,
any defendant may make himself a competent witness by: (1) disclaim-
ing his interest; 93 and (2) either paying or giving security for costs
which have accrued up to that time.94 Understandably this limited ex-
ception does not often arise in contemporary litigation.
B. Procedural Exceptions
Unlike their substantive brethren, procedural exceptions are not
spelled out by the Dead Man's Rule. Instead, they depend for their
vitality to some extent upon after-appearing complementary sections of
the same Act, but to a greater extent, upon subsequent legislation ap-
parently designed to supplement the original statute.
Despite its roots in the original Act, the first procedural exception
promulgated by the legislature has significantly curtailed the opera-
tional effect of the Dead Man's Rule. Recognizing the inherent un-
fairness in the ability of a decedent's representative to call opposing
parties or interested witnesses as for cross-examination to compel
damaging testimony, while at the same time barring favorable self-
testimony, the legislature made the following remedial provision,
known as the "Waiver Rule": 95 "[w]here an incompetent surviving
party or witness' is called on cross-examination and examined as to
matters that occurred during the decedent's lifetime, such examination
makes him a competent witness on all relevant matters."96 Moreover,
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1958).
91. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. McCafferty, 383 Pa. 588, 119 A.2d 297 (1956).
92. See note 90 supra.
93. The disclaimer of interest here is not to be confused with the general release by
a witness of his interest before being called to testify which renders him competent on
all matters (without qualification). Semple v. Callery, 184 Pa. 95, 39 A. 6 (1898).
94. Burke v. Burke, 240 Pa. 379, 87 A. 960 (1913); see note 90 supra.
95. It is important to note that the entire incompetency objection grounded on the
Dead Man Act may be waived generally, if the party having standing to do so fails to
interject a timely objection. Hughes v. Bailey, 202 Pa. Super. 263, 195 A.2d 281 (1963);
see Annot., 159 A.L.R. 411 (1945).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 387 (1958); see Weaver v. Welsh, 325 Pa. 571, 191 A. 3
(1937).
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:as an incident to being called for cross-examination, the interested
witness or party may thereafter testify in his own behalf. 7
In 1891, a second procedural exception was independently created
by the Pennsylvania legislature to help correct another substantial in-
equity.08 Before the enactment of this exception, it was apparently the
practice of ambitious representatives to call supportive witnesses for
the purpose of buttressing their trial posture. As a result, adverse
parties and interested witnesses were permanently resigned to a specta-
tor's role in the courtroom: for, once their lips had been sealed by the
Dead Man's Rule, it was impossible for them to refute or rebut testi-
mony volunteered by the representative's witnesses. Responding to this
anomalous situation, the legislature passed curative legislation which
in substance requires:
* . .the full competency for purposes of rebuttal of any surviving
adverse party or interested witness, where the relevant matter
occurs between the surviving party and any other person, who,
living at the time of trial, gives testimony against the interest of
the surviving party or interested witness; or, if such relevant
matter occurred in the presence or hearing of such other living or
competent person who has already been adversely called.90
An important limitation is that the surviving party or interested wit-
ness is competent to testify only to matters about which the other
surviving) person has testified. 1°0
Some forty years later, in 1931, the legislature again acted to limit
the purview of the Dead Man's Rule. This time, the effects of the rule
were checked insofar as they affected the ability of surviving spouses to
testify concerning matters involving the fundamental right to share in
their deceased spouses' estate. 1' 1 Literally construed, this execption
makes the surviving husband or wife a competent witness "in any
proceeding where the matter in issue shall be the right of such survivor
to share in the estate of the deceased spouse by reason of an alleged
97. The statute reads: "fully competent witnesses ... as to all relevant matters . ..
whether or not these matters were touched upon in cross-examination ..... PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 387 (1958).
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 325 (1958).
99. Id.
100. Id.; see Bowman's Estate, 301 Pa. 337, 152 A. 38 (1930); Volkwein v. Volkwein, 146
Pa. Super. 265, 22 A.2d 81 (1941). See also 5 U. PITT. L. REv. 125 (1939).
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 329 (1958). Repealed in so far as it relates to dispositions
of real or personal estate by will by the Act of April 24, 1947, Pa. P.L. 89, § 21, and in
so far as it relates to inheritance by the Act of April 24, 1947, Pa. P.L. 80, § 16. .
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desertion or nonsupport of the. deceased spouse for one whole year
prior to death.' 01 °2 The statute is also definitive on the degree or scope
of competency which is to prevail, i.e., "the surviving husband or wife
shall be a competent witness as to all matters pertinent to the issue,
whether the same occurred before or after the death of the deceased
-spouse, and whether the deceased spouse died testate or intestate.' '10 3
The last legislatively imposed exception to be considered is some-
what of a procedural hybrid. Although originally passed as an aspect of
the Divorce Code, its effects have tangentially invaded the province of
the Dead Man Statute. 04 Reduced to its simplest terms, the code
provides that in proceedings for divorce by the libellant against a duly
adjudged lunatic spouse, "the libellant shall be a fully competent wit-
ness to prove all facts."' 05 Practically speaking, this abolishes the Dead
Man's Rule in all divorce proceedings.0 6
Borrowing its cue from the legislature, the Pennsylvania judiciary
has continued the struggle for increased competency among witnesses
by excepting important discovery procedures from the scope of the
Dead Man Act. Courts have held that the use at trial by a decedent's
representative of -depositions obtained from opposing parties or wit-
nesses is tantamount to a forfeiture of the incompetency objection. 17
Commonwealth forums have also ruled that where an enterprising
representative introduces his decedent's deposition into evidence, all
surviving parties and witnesses are thereby rendered fully competent to
testify' 08 Finally, in Perlis v. Kuhns,'09 the court conclusively estab-
lished the procedural guidelines of pre-trial discovery as they relate to
the Dead Man's Rule in Pennsylvania. In that decision, the court
equated the very use of depositions and interrogatories to placing the
opposing party on the witness stand. Reaffirming a quotation from the
lower court, the Perlis court said:
... any other construction of the Statute would enable one party to
search the conscience of his adversary, drag to light his private
102. Id.
103' Id. But see Ray's Estate, 304 Pa. 421, 156 A. 64 (1931) (a surviving spouse was
prohibited from testifying to matters unrelated to desertion or nonsupport).
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 50 (1955).
105. Id.
106. Hickey v. Hickey, 138 Pa. Super. 271, 11 A.2d 187 (1940).
107. Sarnoskie v. Beadling, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 1 (C.P. Alleg. Co. 1962); see 2 G. HENRY,
PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 765 (4th ed. 1953).
108. Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959).
109. 202 Pa. Super. 80, 195 A.2d 156 (1963).
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papers and other evidence and then repudiate the result if the ex-
periment proved unsatisfactory."10
Thus, the current state of the law in Pennsylvania is that the mere
taking of a deposition or interrogatory, even without its subsequent
introduction into evidence or use at trial, operates as a waiver of any
objection grounded on the Act of 1887.1'
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
As a collective body, dead man statutes represent a formidable and
perhaps insurmountable barrier to every interested survivor who as-
pires to testify against a decedent's estate. Faced with this dilemma,
survivors have been forced to seek new avenues of argument in an effort
to present their testimony. Necessity, being the mother of invention,
has pricked a nation-wide search for innovative ideas to escape the
pernicious effects of the statute. At least one resourceful survivor has
sought the comfort and assistance of the Federal Constitution in a bid
to overcome his incompetency. In Corso v. Security-First National
Bank," 2 the California plaintiff was confronted with an incompetency
objection furnished by a local version of the Dead Man Act. In a final
attempt to evade the statute, plaintiff urged that the due process and
equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution were vio-
lated by the prohibition of her testimony."13 Appellant's argument
apparently fell upon deaf ears since the court summarily dismissed both
claims without elaboration.. 4 Thus, even resort to the Constitution
has proven futile as a means of eliminating the Dead Man's dogma.
V. PRESUMPTIONS AND BUR.DENS OF PROOF
When a survivor or interested witness enters a courtroom to debate
the facts of an intervivos transaction, he is likely to be confronted
with multiple rather than single Opponents. In addition to the dece-
110. Id. at 84, 195 A.2d at 159.
111. The benefit of the Dead Man's Rule is also waived where a personal representa-
tive or a decedent, prior to his death, initiates the discovery through interrogatories,
despite that the answers thereto are never used at trial. Brown v. Saladoff, 209 Pa. Super.
263, 228 A.2d 205 (1967).
112. 171 Cal. App. 2d 816, 342 P.2d 56 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
113. Id. at 829, 342 P.2d at 59.
114. Id.
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dent's representative, such obstacles as legal presumptions"15 and bur-
dens of proof"16 often make the road to recovery inaccessible to a
survivor laboring under the independent and weighty handicap of
incompetency. For example, in litigation growing out of tortuous con-
duct in which the survivor participated and which proximately caused
the decedent's death, a presumption of due care must be awarded to
the absent decedent." 7 Unable to testify in his own behalf because of
the Dead Man's Rule, a survivor is hard-pressed to overcome this pre-
sumption and convince the trier of fact that he was not the incident's
culpable wrongdoer. Burdens of proof also commonly create serious
problems for the survivor. Where the action is against a decedent's
estate, whether sounding in contract or tort, the survivor is required
to furnish the court with "clear and convincing evidence" of his posi-
tion in order to prevail." 8 Since most private transactions are neither
witnessed nor well documented, the establishment of separate, self-
supporting proof of this quality by the survivor is a difficult, if not
impossible task.1 9 This same discrimination against the survivor also
permeates contractual disputes relating to the alleged intervivos trans-
fer of property by a decedent to his survivor. 20 Given the presence of a
Dead Man Act, representatives of the decedent's interests can effec-
tively direct a verdict in their favor, once the proponent of the transfer
fails, by evidence aliunde, to establish the propriety of the purported
transfer.' 2' With a simple citation to the rule, representatives of the
115. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2483-98 (3d ed. 1940). See generally id. §§ 2499-550
(burdens and presumptions in specific issues); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Pre-
sumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906 (1931); Taintor, Presumptions in Pennsylvania, 17 PA-
B. Ass'N Q. 89 (1945-1946).
116. See 9 J. WIMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2493-98 (3d ed. 1940). See generally id. §§ 2499-550
(burdens and presumptions in specific issues); McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of
Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 242 (1944).
117. Yuhasz v. Pitt Constr. Co., 305 Pa. 166, 157 A. 461 (1931); Sadowski v. Eazor Exp.,.
Inc., 213 Pa. Super. 471, 249 A.2d 842 (1968).
118. Petro v. Secary Estate, 403 Pa. 540, 170 A.2d 325 (1961). This measure of persuasion,
is more exacting than the normal burden of proof required in civil cases generally, i.e.,.
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Typically, this special standard has been
reserved for cases of fraud, mistake, undue influence, and the like. See C. MCCORMICK,.
EVIDENCE § 320 (1954); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (3d ed. 1940). But see Ferguson Pack-
ing Co. v. Mihalic, 99 Pa. Super. 158 (1930) (construing "clear, precise and indubitable-
proof" to mean proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
119. See notes 12 supra & 121 infra.
120. Clay's Estate, 438 Pa. 183, 264 A.2d 632 (1970); Ford's Estate, 431 Pa. 185, 245,
A.2d 443 (1968); In re Hendrickson Estate, 388 Pa. 39, 130 A.2d 143 (1957).
121. See In re Hendrickson Estate, 388 Pa. 39, 130 A.2d 143 (1957), in which the court
expressed sympathy for an alleged donee rendered incompetent by the Pennsylvania statute
when her claim to a family heirloom was defeated for lack of corroborative evidence. The-
court said: "Unfortunately for appellant, proof of her title depended principally if not.
solely, on her own testimony." Id. at 44, 130 A.2d at 146.
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estate can prevent the court from receiving any relevant testimonial
evidence from the very party upon whom the court has placed the
burden of proving the bona fides of the purported transfer. 122 More-
over, the testimony is deemed excludable because it is relevant; i.e.,
relates to or bears upon the point or fact in issue, to wit, the intervivos
transaction between the decedent and the party now claiming adversely
to his interest as donee, grantee, or assignee.123
VI. VARIATIONS ON THE THEME
Virtually every state has enacted some form of Dead Man legisla-
tion. 24 The Pennsylvania statute does not differ substantially in con-
tent from the great majority of existing acts. All prima facie reject the
survivor as a witness if he possesses a pecuniary interest in the outcome
of the litigation. Some states admit his testimony at the discretion of
the court.125 Other states allow the survivor's testimony to be counter-
balanced by a decedent's intervivos statements, if relevant to the trans-
action, as an exception to the hearsay rule.126 Still others require
corroboration before a survivor is permitted to testify. 27
Despite the total lack of infatuation with dead man statutes in gen-
eral, they continue to prosper, and thereby daily plague the legal com-
munity. 28 The abolition of such legislation is a perennial issue in
every jurisdiction.
By and large, commonwealth lawyers share this displeasure with the
rule. 29 Consequently, innumerable attempts to repeal or modify the
Act of 1887 have been made by the Pennsylvania legislature since
122. Id.
123. Id. It is important to note that the rule also prevents a survivor from laying the
proper foundation (at trial) for the introduction of written evidence in support of his
case.
124. See A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 334-41 (1949);
Chadbourn, History and Interpretation of the California Dead Man Statute: A Proposal
for Liberalization, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 175 (1957); Ladd, The Dead Man's Statute, 26 IOWA
L. REV. 201 (1941); Levin, Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Presumptions
and Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1954); 31 ILL. L. REy. 218 (1936).
125. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 12, § 2201 (1939); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 93, ch.
701, § 3 (1947); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 392, §§ 25-26 (1942).
126. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. tit. 52, § 145 (1930); S.D. CODE § 36.0104 (1939).
127. N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, §§ 1-6 (1953). The states of Massachusetts and Rhode
Island propose a compromise. They admit declarations of a decedent as an exception to
the hearsay rule only if corroborated. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (1956); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 538, § 6 (1938).
128. See E. MORGAN & OTHERS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM
23 (1927); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 578 (3d ed. 1940).
129. See note 3 supra.
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the advent of the statute. 3 0 On a more recent note, two such efforts
have come within the last decade. In the 1963 Session, a proposal to
amend the statute was introduced.'13  The crux of that bill was an
attempt to incorporate the successful features of other states' statutes
which admit relevant statements and memoranda made by the de-
cedent or lunatic party into evidence as a specie of rebuttal testimony,
via an exception to the hearsay rule. 3 2 However, rather than yield to
the pressing need for reform, the Pennsylvania legislature declined this
beguiling invitation to modernize the statute by defeating the pro-
posed bill. Not to be easily dissuaded, the disenchanted opposition
regrouped and made a second attempt during the 1969 Session; this
time, an endeavor to repeal the rule in its entirety. 3 3 But it met with
a similar fate. These two recent encounters suggest an intent on the
part of the legislature to retain the Dead Man's Rule intact, notwith-
standing its opprobrious character.
Nationally, efforts to abrogate the Dead Man's Rule have been well
received.3 4 The Uniform Rules of Evidence, drafted by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and ap-
proved by the American Bar Association in 1953, generally abolish
disqualifications of witnesses. 3 5 Rule 7 of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence' 6 states:
Except as otherwise provided in these rules (a) every person is
qualified to be a witness ... (c) no person is disqualified to testify
to any matter ... and (e) all relevant evidence is admissible.
The opportunity to reject a survivor's testimony still exists, however,
under Rule 45, which vests discretion in the judge to exclude other-
wise admissible evidence "if he finds that its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will create
substantial danger of undue prejudice." On the federal level, the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, which would apply to the United
130. See note 3 supra. See also Erwin, Report of Committee on Judicial Administra-
tion, 25 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 372 (1954); McWilliams., Judicial Administration, 24 PA. B. ASS'N Q.
179 (1953).
131. S.B. 126, 147th Sess. of Pa. Gen. Assembly (1963).
132. Id.
133. H.B. 972, 153d Sess. of Pa. Gen. Assembly (1969).
134. See Taylor v. Crain, 224 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1955) (holding the Pennsylvania Dead
Man's Statute inapplicable to admiralty cases in federal court).
135. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(4)(c) provides for the admission of a decedent's
statements into evidence under the hearsay exception.
136. Id., rule 7.
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-States courts and magistrates, make every person a competent witness,
:subject only to the first-hand knowledge prerequisite. 13 7
VII. CRITIQUE OF THE RuLE
Despite bona fide intentions surrounding its enactment, the Penn-
:sylvania Dead Man's Rule has proven to be nothing more than a
wooden test of fairness, blindly applied by the courts to honest and
dishonest survivors alike. Although the rule does accomplish its cal-
,culated objective of eliminating interested survivors' testimony, it
suffers from too many serious deficiencies to be considered a valuable
ally of even-handed justice. At least five legitimate bases for its aboli-
tion may be advanced.
First, the rule ignores the existence of psychological interest as an
equal or competing motive for witness perjury. Consider this illustra-
tion:
A, a lifelong friend or relative of plaintiff P, seeks to testify in
support of P's claim concerning the disputed terms of a contract
existing between P and the decedent. B, a stranger, chance witness,
and minority stockholder in the C corporation, proposes to testify
to the facts of a highway mishap involving the decedent and a C
corporation truck. As the decedent's representative, whose or which
:testimony (if any) would you like to see excluded?
Second, by employing only a threshold standard of "interest," the
rule fails miserably to acknowledge vital distinctions between nominal
and substantial pecuniary interests. Consider this illustration:
Decedent D sustains fatal injuries in a fall on the C corporation's
property. Two eye witnesses, W1 and W 2, offer pro-corporation
testimony at trial. W, is a majority or controlling stockholder in
the C corporation. W 2's wife owns one (1) share of C corporation
stock. Again, as the decedent's representative, whose or which
testimony (if any) would you like to see excluded?
Third, the rule severely underestimates the intellectual ability of
jurors to recognize and appreciate self-serving testimony. 38 Recent
137. Id., rule 45.
138. See Schulman, supra note 3, at 184-85.
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studies indicate that contemporary juries are far more sophisticated
than their precursors. 139 In addition, the individuals who comprise them
are apparently more intelligent than ever before. 140 Hence, it lies within
the capacity of every juror individually, and the jury as a whole, to com-
prehend the nature of any interest (financial or otherwise) that a sur-
vivor may bring to the witness stand.
Fourth, the rule operates to compel juries to decide key factual
disputes without the aid of percipient witness testimony. Lacking
this essential evidence, it is impossible for the jury to effectively per-
form its fact-finding function. Thus, the chance or likelihood of judi-
cial misdecision is greatly increased by application of the rule. More-
over, verdicts based on this brand of "fragmentary proof" neither
reflect equality nor do they inspire public confidence in the courts.
Finally, invocation of the rule hinders attainment of the most funda-
mental goal or objective of every rule of evidence, namely, the revela-
tion of truth. It should be self-evident that the whole truth cannot
be reached with only a fraction of the evidence.
When viewed separately, each of these negative factors is persuasive
authority for the discontinuance of the rule. Taken together, they
clearly outweigh any positive virtues associated with its use.
VIII. PROPOSALS
Pecuniary interest should be considered, like other garden-variety
witness interests, as affecting credibility rather than competency. 14'
Comment on the extent of pecuniary interest should properly be left
as the subject of cross-examination, which Wigmore calls "the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."' 42 As an added
safeguard as well as an equitable alternative to the complete exclusion
of his testimony, the exact or relative extent of a survivor's pecuniary
interest in the litigation should perhaps become an aspect or element
of the judge's charge to the jury. 43 Use of this device would provide the
139. Doubsberg, On Keeping the Civil Jury Trial, 43 NORTE DAME LAw. 344 (1967-
1968); Kalvin, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964); Sommers, Some
Merits of Civil Jury Trials, 39 TULANE L. REV. 3 (1964-1965).
140. Id.
141. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 943-69 (3d ed. 1940). See also Dalbey's Estate, 326
Pa. 285, 192 A. 129 (1937).
142. 5 J. WIGMIORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
143. After a standard or formal charge relating to the credibility of witnesses in general,
language similar in import to the following could be inserted: "In evaluating the testimony
given by witness X in this proceeding, you should consider as a fact that he (or she) has a
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jury with some background against which to gauge the caliber of a
witness's prior testimony. 44 And, when added to other available in-
dicia of witness credibility such as attitude, appearance and demeanor,
the jury would undoubtedly be in a better position to determine
whether or not or to what extent a witness should be believed.
In conclusion, the time has come for the Pennsylvania legislature
to begin assuming some responsibility to the living by taking affirma-
tive action toward the repeal of an antiquated statute that heightens
the vagaries and represses the actualities of each and every case to
which it is applied.
In its present form, the Pennsylvania Dead Man's Rule is hopelessly
diseased with discrimination and inequality. Moreover, no amount of
modification or amendment will arrest this pathology. In the interest
of fairness to surviving persons whose only error in life was to "Out-
live" their opponents, the rule should be totally abolished. The
absolute disqualification mandated by the statute is too severe a price
to pay regularly in the hope that a possible occurrence of prejudice
will be circumvented. 145 Justice would be better served by adopting
the common-sense approach espoused by Bentham, who in 1827, said:
In principle there is but one mode of searching out truth *** be
the dispute what it may, see everything that is to be seen; hear
everybody who is likely to know anything about the matter; hear
everybody, but most attentively of all, and first of all, those who are
likely to know about it-the parties. 46
definite financial or monetary interest in its outcome. Unlike other witnesses who have
testified, witness X stands to gain or profit, financially, from the testimony which he (or
she) has given here. This does not mean that witness X cannot or should not be believed.
But in your appraisal of his (or her) testimony, you should be aware of the presence of this
self-interest."
Although the practical effect of such a charge or statement by a judge may be to impeach
the credibility of witness X in its entirety, from an informational standpoint, the jury
would clearly profit from having the benefit of this otherwise "unavailable" testimony.
144. See Denver City Tramway Co. v. Norton, 141 F. 599 (8th Cir. 1905). The
plaintiff was permitted to describe the character and extent of her injuries in contradiction
to the testimony of defendant's medical expert. The court held that the defendant was
entitled to a charge to the jury that it may take into consideration that the plaintiff is
directly interested in the result of the proceeding.
145. Chadbourn put it this way:
In the opinion of the writer the good which the Statute accomplishes covers a
relatively small area and is at best conjectural and problematical whereas the in-
justice it perpetuates is demonstrable and covers a wide area of honest claims de-
feated for want of a type of proof (the party's testimony) which today no one would
think of excluding as a general proposition. Balancing the justice of the Statute
against the injustices, it must and should be condemned as preponderantly an
instrument of injustice and, as such, it should be repealed.
Chadbourn, History and Interpretation of the California Dead Man Statute: A Pro-
posal for Liberalization, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 175, 211 (1957).
146. 7 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 487, 507 (Bowrings ed. 1827).
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